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A news broadcast on a missile launch by North Korea plays on a monitor on a street in Tokyo, Japan, on Nov. 18. (EPA/Yonhap)

During World War II, even when Germany completely surrendered in May 1945 and the war was declared over, Japan did not surrender. It is said that this was due to the reckless assessment of the situation by the Japanese leadership, especially that of the military, which had decided that it would fight until the bitter end.

Many think that it took the catastrophic damage of the US dropping atomic bombs on it for Japan to realize the severity of the situation and finally capitulate.

Some revisionists say that it wasn’t the A-bombs dropped by the US, but because of the Soviet’s participation in the war that Japan surrendered. They believe that Japan surrendered after the Soviet Union declared war on Japan on Aug. 9, conquered Manchuria with unstoppable force, and threatened to invade the Japanese mainland.

Historians say that Japan most likely hurried to surrender because they feared that if the Soviet Union managed to march onto the mainland they would’ve done away with Japan’s emperor and various other aspects of Japanese identity. In addition, they were afraid that they, too, would become a socialist society.

These two viewpoints are based on the fact that Japan failed to read the political situation, tried to recklessly wait it out, and belatedly surrendered. Was the Japanese leadership swept up in such madness and dysfunctionality that it was unable to predict the desperate war situation or the Soviet Union’s participation in the war?

There are arguments and studies that prove this wrong. Some believe that Japan delayed its surrender so that it could have an advantage after the war. By inducing the Soviet Union to participate, they were able to create a US-Soviet confrontation structure in East Asia and therefore was a ploy for a “balance of power” that would give themselves some leverage after the war.

If Japan had surrendered early, China, Manchuria, the Korean Peninsula — most of East Asia would have fallen into the US’ sphere of influence. In that case, Japan reckoned that the US would force Japan to pay harsh war reparations, as the US would not have any rivals. They also reckoned that their international status after the war would be insignificant.

Yukiko Koshiro, a professor at Nihon University, made this analysis in an article in the American Historical Review, “Eurasian Eclipse: Japan’s End Game in World War II,” in April 2004. Koshiro analyzed that Japan knew that they did not have a chance of winning after losing the Battle of Leyte Gulf in October 1944, and so they tried to come up with an end game for the war by preparing a strategy to balance the power between the Soviet Union and the US.

In a report made in March 1945, Adm. Sokichi Takagi, who had been studying different strategies that could be used to end the war, stated that America would only recognize Japan’s importance when it realized that it could not be the only force to face the Soviet Union in Asia.

Col. Sakou Tanemura, who was in charge of the operation for ending the war with the Soviet Union, also recommended that Japan should surrender after the Soviet Union stationed their army in Manchuria and the Korean Peninsula, regardless of the US military’s attack on the Japanese mainland.

Koshiro tried to bring to light that Japan’s end-of-war strategy was made so that it would be easier for the Soviet Union to enter the Korean Peninsula and to prevent the US from getting its foot in the door. In 1945, Japan adjusted its deployment of troops to the Korean Peninsula by focusing on defending the south from the United States. They also did not move 1 million troops from China to Manchuria to counter the Soviet invasion. The Kwantung Army, which was Imperial Japan’s best force, retreated without putting up a fight when the Soviet Union marched onwards. If the Soviet army advanced by 40 kilometers, the Japanese army was ordered to retreat by 80.

Japan accepted the Potsdam Declaration, which demanded unconditional surrender, 30 hours after the Soviet Union waded into the war. Japan surrendered to the US after inducing the Soviets to participate in the war and so allowed the Soviets to gain some clout in East Asia. As such, Japan could side with the US and cooperate with the US so as to keep the Soviet Union in check.

Former Prime Minister Fumimaro Konoe, who was a peacemaker, called the Soviet Union’s participation in the war “a gift from god,” since “now we can put an end to this war.” After the war, Japan did not have to pay security costs underneath the US’ security umbrella, and has enjoyed high-speed economic growth and the economic benefits of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, which they had dreamt about since World War II. After the war, former Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida claimed that Japan was “better off as the loser of World War II, rather than as the winner of World War I.”

Despite its geopolitical status as possessing one of the few naval forces that could block Eurasian continental forces such as China and Russia, Japan has always pursued a balance of power with those mainland forces. This means that there are always threats and crises that people on the Korean Peninsula must face. But Korea is also responsible for finding opportunities amidst such threats.

The division of the Korean Peninsula can be attributed to Japan’s geopolitical balance of power, which also gave birth to their war end-game strategy. However, Japan’s attempt to balance power between the US on one side and China and Russia on the other presented the route that the postwar conservative mainstream might take. This also applied to the divided Korean Peninsula.

The Japanese “conservative mainstream,” which was represented by Shigeru Yoshida, tried to prioritize the economy and focused on mending ties with neighboring countries. Yoshida tried very early on to bring Japan’s relationship with China back to normal.

Prime ministers who came later, like Ichiro Hatoyama and Tanzan Ishibashi, also insisted on reconciliation with China to secure economic benefits and warned against choosing one side in the midst of the Cold War order.

When the socialist bloc began to crumble in the early 1990s, Japan was the first to try and normalize relations with North Korea.

In September 1990, then-Liberal Democratic Party Vice President Shin Kanemaru unexpectedly visited North Korea and announced a joint declaration on the normalization of diplomatic relations between the two countries after holding talks with then-North Korean leader Kim Il-sung. Attempts at establishing diplomatic ties came again in 2002, when then-Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi visited North Korea and also announced a joint declaration.

However, after the Shinzo Abe administration, Japan has been faced with a changed situation in the wake of China's rise and its own relative decline.

Japan is seeking a balance of power in East Asia advantageous to it by strengthening its alliance with the US, leaning on demonizing North Korea as a tactic for doing so. A chief example of this is how Japan obstructed the normalization of North Korea-US relations from behind the scenes during the Moon Jae-in administration.

Japan has shown two sides to its relationship with China, Russia, and especially with North Korea, through being highly opportunistic and tactical.

After the war, Japan viewed the division of the Korean Peninsula as something that would remain constant and basically chose a geopolitical strategy that sought an advantageous balance of power.

However, even throughout this process, Japan has constantly tried to take the lead in strengthening its relations with China, Russia and North Korea.

Regarding the situation in East Asia, including the Korean Peninsula issue, South Korea should neither align itself with nor denounce Japan's strategy and position.

South Korea must first stabilize its own relations with China, Russia and North Korea to gain leverage over Japan and only then can we expect Japan to play a positive role in the Korean Peninsula issue. This is why the Yoon Suk-yeol government’s strategy of going all-in with Japan is both risky and alarming.

By Jung E-gil, senior staff writer

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