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President Yoon Suk-yeol of South Korea and President Joe Biden of the US hold a joint press conference following their summit on May 21, 2022, at the presidential office in Seoul’s Yongsan District. (presidential office pool photo)

“America doesn’t even share nukes with its brothers.”

This comment was made by a US official in response to talk of potential nuclear sharing between Korea and the US in a private meeting between foreign affairs and security personnel of the two countries.

“The US and Europe have close historic and cultural ties, and we have a special relationship with the UK in particular as our former colonizer. However, nuclear sharing between the US and Europe is nothing more than symbolic,” the official taking part in the meeting stated. “We don’t even have nuclear sharing with Anglo-Saxon countries and Europe, who are akin to our brothers, so why should we share with Korea?”

In the face of the growing North Korean nuclear threat, some lawmakers from Korea’s ruling People Power Party have suggested NATO-style nuclear sharing as a way to strengthen confidence in KORUS extended deterrence. In other words, Korea seeks to share nuclear weapons with the US in a manner similar to NATO.

NATO nuclear sharing is the European version of extended deterrence. This is known as a “nuclear alliance” of systematic and institutional cooperation over the extended deterrence strategy between the US and its European allies.

Proponents of this idea view sharing as shorthand for joint ownership. However, this is based on the misconception that NATO nuclear sharing involves joint ownership and use of nuclear weapons between the US and NATO. In reality, NATO nuclear sharing refers to the US deploying strategic nuclear weapons in the territory of European allies, the involvement of European countries in nuclear planning through “nuclear planning groups,” and the use of air force aircraft belonging to European allies as a means of dropping nuclear weapons on target locations.

However, NATO allies have no ownership, decision-making or veto rights over US tactical nuclear weapons. In this sense, the US does not share nuclear ownership with NATO. The nuclear weapons deployed in Europe are stored in the air force munitions storehouses of European allies, but remain under US control. The US is solely responsible for managing and maintaining the weapons, with European partners simply providing the facilities and security.

The US has never shared final decision-making rights on the use of nuclear weapons with an allied nation, and such rights remain exclusively with the American president. In the event of an emergency, the US forces enter a code which is known only by the president, and the tactical nuclear weapons are equipped to NATO aircraft by the munitions unit of the US Air Force. The NATO planes are then in charge of dropping the nukes on the designated target.

As NATO air force plans are responsible for transporting and dropping the weapons, there are those who believe the European allies have a veto right on the use of nuclear weapons if there is a difference of opinion between NATO and the US. However, the US has a range of alternative routes for launching nuclear weapons if European allies refuse to transport them, so in practice it would be difficult for NATO to veto the unilateral use of nuclear weapons by the US.

Accordingly, NATO’s nuclear sharing is not about owning or sharing usage rights to nuclear weapons, but a means of sharing the political burden and operational risks. The part that is “shared” is responsibility and risk rather than actual ownership and authority.

In a New Year’s interview with the Chosun Ilbo newspaper, President Yoon Suk-yeol stated that Korea and the US are “discussing a plan to operate US nuclear capabilities under the concept of ‘joint planning and joint practice’” in order to respond to North Korea’s nuclear weapons and missiles.

“If Korea and the US can get to a place where we work together on planning, practice, training and operations in relation to the management of nuclear capabilities through shared information, it would serve as an effective measure that is on par with nuclear sharing,” Yoon said.

The fact that Yoon referred to joint planning, practice and training instead of using the term “nuclear sharing” is because there is no chance of the US agreeing to such a request.

We have seen rose-tinted interpretations alluding to “Korean-style nuclear sharing” in the wake of Yoon’s remarks, but considering the reality of NATO’s nuclear sharing, it appears it will be difficult to reach a level of partnership that equates to true nuclear sharing between the US and Korea.

By Kwon Hyuk-chul, staff reporter

Please direct questions or comments to [english@hani.co.kr]