hankyoreh

North Korean leader Kim Jong-un takes a tour of a facility housing Hwasong-12 intermediate-range ballistic missiles. (Yonhap)

On the first day of the new year, we were met with news headlines that couldn’t have been further from the prospect of peace.

Early in the morning, breaking news alerts announced that North Korea had fired a missile from a multiple rocket launcher and three missiles the day before, which was followed by reports of the results of North Korea’s party plenary meeting throughout the day.

For instance, leader Kim Jong-un ordered the “mass production” of tactical nuclear weapons and an “exponential increase” of North Korea’s nuclear arsenal, as well as proposing a new strategy for North Korea’s military arsenal by increasing new intercontinental ballistic missile nuclear warheads and strengthening mobilization.

The reports were received by international news broadcasters such as the BBC and CNN and provided a dark backdrop for the jubilant fireworks commemorating the start of the new year.

Since August 2022, US strategic weapons capable of nuclear attacks have been mobilized for joint drills by South Korea, the US and Japan. With North Korea responding with various missile launches along with legislation on nuclear weapon operations, the possibility of nuclear war is becoming a prominent part of the military issues of the Korean Peninsula.

It is reasonable to say that the possibility of a nuclear war is still low, even if it is not zero percent, and even though it has increased relatively compared to the past.

Nevertheless, it is essential to analyze the outlook and meaning of North Korea’s declaration at a plenary session of the party’s Central Committee on Dec. 26, 2022, that it will proceed without hesitation according to its own time frame.

North Korea declared the completion of its nuclear forces in November 2017, basing that announcement on six nuclear tests — including the testing of nuclear fissure bombs and nuclear fusion bombs — and the successful launch of ICBMs and two satellites.

On the surface, it mimics China’s “Two Bombs, One Satellite” project that was realized in 1970, but it was an insufficient completion in terms of the weapons’ actual capacities and technology.

North Korea could’ve used its nuclear force like a pawn it’d sacrifice in a chess game, but after the Hanoi talks broke down in 2019, North Korea’s nuclear force has been promoted from a pawn to a queen.

The completion of its nuclear force was not a one-time declaration but became a process in which North Korea continuously improved the quality of completion.

If we look at the cases of India and Pakistan, which achieved nuclear armament after six nuclear tests, North Korea’s need for additional tests for atomic or hydrogen bombs may not be technically significant if they are not being used politically as protests.

However, while in possession of missiles like the Hwasong-17, which have sufficient ICBM range capability, North Korea will have to continue to increase the missile’s power, aim to make them multi-warheads, and hone the details and the specificity of the missile’s path.

When it comes to satellites, North Korea’s goal is the same as what it announced: to possess and operate military reconnaissance satellites.

Kwangmyongsong-3 and Kwangmyongson-4, satellites launched respectively in 2012 and 2016 which successfully entered orbit, are known to have a light payload weight of 100 kilograms and cannot operate normally.

If carrying the same payload as an ICBM, a satellite requires greater thrust at the beginning of the launch.

North Korea’s new solid-fuel engine test for ICBMs on Dec. 16 and its rocket launch test for reconnaissance satellites on Dec. 18 showed that the rate of technological progress in both North Korea’s projectiles and payloads is quite rapid.

Perhaps in the near future, North Korea may be launching a medium-sized satellite that weighs more than 500 kilograms using the rocket booster at the Dongchang Village satellite launch site.

North Korea’s nuclear forces will form a dyad system, with only ICBMs and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM), as it will not include strategic bombers. This is different from the nuclear triad system adopted by the U. and Russia, in which they utilize all three aspects: ICBMs, SLBMs and strategic bombers.

If tactical nuclear weapons become an important factor of its nuclear force system, they will be included in North Korea’s nuclear triad in the stead of strategic bombers.

North Korea has continued to push for the development of long-range SLBM (Pukkuksongs), and in July 2019, Kim Jong-un revealed on-site guidance of a nuclear submarine under construction.

Tactical nuclear weapons are being strengthened by the conduction of test launches of short-range ballistic missiles such as KN-23 and KN-24, KN-25 (a large-caliber multiple launch guided rocket system) and land-launched cruise missiles.

From now on, North Korea is likely to launch short-range missiles for routine exercises or demonstrations, and focus more on developing and testing nuclear submarines, SLBMs, and cruise missiles.

The response to North Korea strengthening its nuclear arms is to emphasize the so-called “extended deterrence” provided by the US and to curb its impact by the more conventional method of increasing arms, which South Korea and Japan adopt.

Extended deterrence, commonly referred to as the “nuclear umbrella,” was originally a guarantee that the US provided to NATO members in Europe against Soviet nuclear threats in the 1950s.

Paradoxically, this guarantee led to an infinite nuclear arms race between the US and the Soviet Union and an even higher risk of a nuclear war, as other countries were restricted from possessing nuclear arms and increased the dependence of those countries on the US.

Although it may be a stretch to compare the nuclear statuses of North Korea and the US and the US’ provision of extended deterrence to South Korea and Japan to the circumstances of the Cold War, this paradoxical aspect does provide a sense of urgency.

The arms race on the Korean Peninsula is expected to intensify structurally for the time being. This is due to the fact that the basic framework of the US’ global strategy of blockading China will not change easily, and it is difficult for South Korea and Japan to escape their alliance with the US.

We also see structural inequalities and irrationalities in the execution of deterrence. The non-nuclear states of South Korea and Japan have taken on roles that raise the risk of escalation and incur major costs despite their questionable effectiveness, including preemptive strikes with advanced conventional weapons, decapitation operations, massive retaliation and retaliatory strikes against enemy bases.

The US, which has the biggest nuclear arsenal of them all, presents a lot of flashy rhetoric while taking part in joint exercises at almost no extra cost to itself. Meanwhile, it profits from the sales of expensive weaponry.

South Korea’s defense budget this year amounts to over 57 trillion won, which is nominally larger than Japan’s defense budget. Japan, for its part, has decided to double its defense spending over the next five years and establish “counterstrike capabilities” against North Korea.

Ending the arms race will require two forms of faith from each party to this antagonism: confidence in their own defensive abilities and belief that the other side is willing to abandon war. Not only do South and North Korea not meet these criteria, but the distrust between them is only growing.

On the first day of 2023, the commander-in-chief of South Korea’s military called for action and a “willingness to fight,” while the official in charge of national defense made renewed mention of an end to the North Korean regime. Military commanders began preparing for action befitting a civilian control force.

Where are things headed with the security of the Republic of Korea and the Korean Peninsula community?

By Moon Jang-ryul, former professor at Korea National Defense University

Please direct questions or comments to [english@hani.co.kr]