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President Joe Biden of the US (center) announces plans for AUKUS with Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese (left) and British Prime Minister Rishi Sunak with the Virginia class nuclear-powered USS Missouri submarine in a port in San Diego, California, on Feb. 13. (UPI/Yonhap)

US President Joe Biden held a press conference with UK Prime Minister Rishi Sunak and Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese on March 13 at Naval Base Point Loma in San Diego, California. The USS Missouri nuclear-powered submarine was visible in the background.

Saying that “we stand at the inflection point in history where the hard work of enhancing deterrence and promoting stability is going to affect the prospect of peace for decades to come,” Biden went on to outline a detailed action plan for the US-UK-Australia alliance known as AUKUS, a trilateral military partnership created to provide Australia with nuclear-powered submarines to deter China. The outline came a year and a half after the three countries announced the formation of AUKUS in Sept. 2021.

Biden did not name a specific country in his speech, but there is no doubt that the US’ strategic objective in forming AUKUS is to contain China’s growing military power.

Already the US launched the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) last year with 14 countries, including South Korea and Japan to isolate and exclude China economically, as well as led the formation of a semiconductor supply chain dialogue (in the form of “Chip 4” alliance) with South Korea, Japan and Taiwan.

A multilateral security framework targeting China is already in place: the “Quad” — short for Quadrilateral Security Dialogue — made up of the US, Japan, Australia and India. The addition of AUKUS is intended to hem in China’s military moves with a nested network of defense. Although they are both cooperative bodies oriented around security, the nature of the two gatherings is slightly different. While the Quad is a loose form of security dialogue, AUKUS aims for much stronger military cooperation, including the sharing of advanced military technologies such as nuclear-powered submarines.

The Virginia class nuclear-powered submarine USS North Dakota heads into the Atlantic Ocean in August 2013. (courtesy of the US Navy/Reuters/Yonhap)

The key feature of AUKUS is that the US and UK partner to provide Australia with nuclear-powered submarines (SSNs). Biden announced that the US and the UK would jointly develop and operate a new nuclear-powered submarine named the SSN-AUKUS. The submarine will be based on a new generation of submarines to be designed by the UK with US technical assistance. The first submarines will be constructed in the UK by the late 2030s and will be made in Australia after 2040.

To fill the power gap until then, the US plans to forward-deploy Virginia-class nuclear-powered submarines and the UK plans on forward-deploying Astute-class nuclear-powered submarines to the HMAS Stirling, a naval base near Perth in Western Australia, beginning as early as 2027.

It will also provide Australia with three US Virginia-class nuclear-powered submarines by the early 2030s, with the possibility of an additional two if needed. Unlike strategic nuclear submarines (such as ballistic missile submarines, SSBNs), the US Navy’s newest generation of 7800-ton submarines, called the Virginia-class submarines, do not carry nuclear weapons. Instead, they are armed with a powerful arsenal of offensive weapons, including 12 vertical launching systems (VLS) for Tomahawk missiles, harpoon missiles, and a variety of torpedoes.

The Royal Australian Navy’s nuclear submarine plans are already partially operational at the AUKUS level. Last year, the Royal Australian Navy sent key personnel to a US nuclear submarine training program, and later this year, a US nuclear submarine will be sent to Australia to help train Australian crews. This is the first time the US has transferred a nuclear submarine or related technology to a foreign country since it did to the United Kingdom in 1958.

The scope of the AUKUS alliance’s cooperation does not stop at nuclear submarines. The three countries have pledged to cooperate on military technology in a much broader range of areas. In total, they plan to establish 17 joint working groups. Nine of these will be submarine-related, with the others covering underwater drones, hypersonic missiles, quantum technologies for next-generation global positioning systems, artificial intelligence, cyberwarfare, and electronic warfare.

This cooperation among Anglo-Saxon allies, who share the same culture and language, is thought to be in order to protect their military and technological superiority over China.

A UK nuclear-powered submarine sits in a military base in Scotland in August 2015. (Reuters/Yonhap)

The reason there is so much talk about the nuclear-powered submarines that Australia will receive is due to their contributions strategically and tactically. The submarines have unparalleled offshore capabilities, which cannot be replicated by conventional submarines. Conventional submarines recharge their diesel engines during their journeys, and then use electricity to power them during operations. This makes them extremely quiet and stealthy underwater, which is an unparalleled strength. However, it also means that conventional subs are difficult to operate at great distances as logistical needs, such as refueling, must be considered.

On the other hand, nuclear-powered submarines are noisier than conventional submarines due to the high-pressure steam pipes that run the nuclear reactors on board, which increases the likelihood of being detected by an enemy ship’s sonar. However, they are much faster than conventional submarines since they do not have to worry about refueling. In recent years, the issue of their noisiness has also been greatly improved with the development of various soundproofing technologies. Also, in deep water, the submarine can hide in shaded areas where sound cannot reach, due to differences in temperature and the salinity of the ocean.

As the Economist reported, citing the US think-tank, the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA), a conventional submarine would only be able to operate for 11 days in the South China Sea after leaving the Stirling base in Western Australia. If the operational area is further beyond the Taiwan Strait, they are virtually unable to participate in operations, rendering them useless.

Nuclear submarines, on the other hand, can remain submerged anywhere for an indefinite period of time (so long as their crew is mentally and physically fit), which means that they can threaten Chinese ships and carry special warfare landing forces.

Therefore, Australia’s acquisition of nuclear-powered submarines will bring about a major shift in military strategy and tactics that could alter the military balance in the Indo-Pacific region. With the operational range vastly expanded, Australia will be able to operate alongside US forces in the Strait of Malacca, the South China Sea, and the Taiwan Strait — areas that were out of reach with conventional submarines. Australia will be an integral part of an encircling network that will threaten China from the south.

Australia will be the first non-nuclear weapons state to possess a nuclear-powered submarine. While India did lease a nuclear-powered submarine from Russia before its 1998 nuclear test, it was returned after a certain period and was never owned by India.

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) does not prevent non-nuclear weapon states from owning nuclear-powered submarines. The “non-explosive, military-grade nuclear material” used to propel naval vessels may be exempted from the International Atomic Agency’s (IAEA) basic safeguards. The AUKUS nuclear-powered submarine project is based on this exception.

However, nuclear proliferation is a constant concern. China has accused AUKUS of transferring nuclear materials illegally. The alliance countered the claim by saying that, while the nuclear-powered submarine’s reactor uses highly enriched uranium, it is soldered and sealed and operates until the submarine is decommissioned without reloading or refueling, so there is no risk of nuclear proliferation, such as nuclear fuel spills.

The IAEA says it will continue to engage in a “very complex, technical negotiation” with the three party countries to prevent nuclear proliferation.

Despite these complexities, many observers believe that it will be hard to refute the claim that this case sets a precedent for many countries that want to acquire nuclear-powered submarines. In particular, it could have profound implications for South Korea’s naval strategy. While the South Korean military has not yet officially announced its intention to acquire nuclear-powered submarines, many arguments have been made for their need in the country.

Former President Moon Jae-in stated during a presidential candidate debate in April 2017 that “the time has come for us to have nuclear-powered submarines,” and in July 2020, Kim Hyun-jong, then second deputy director of the Blue House’s National Security Office stated in a televised interview that “the next generation of [Korea’s] submarines will be nuclear-powered.”

The US maintains that the nuclear-powered submarine program is a “one-time exception,” and that it will not apply to other countries such as South Korea. However, this means that there is little to no reason for the US to prevent South Korea from developing its own technology. Of course, before we proceed with such a project, a thorough examination and discussion of whether South Korea has a military and strategic need for nuclear submarines, and what our technological capabilities are should take place.

By Park Byong-su, senior staff writer

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