hankyoreh

Members of the 34th contingent of the Cheonghae Unit who tested positive for COVID-19 while onboard the 4,400-ton ROKS Munmu the Great get off the Republic of Korea Air Force’s KC-330 multirole aerial tanker at Seoul Air Base on Tuesday. (Yonhap News)

A worst-case scenario COVID-19 cluster infection affecting the 34th contingent of the Cheonghae Unit onboard the 4,400-ton ROKS Munmu the Great, which had been sent to conduct anti-piracy operations in the waters off the African coast, was indisputably the result of a faulty overall response by military authorities.

But many unanswered questions remain in terms of how the virus spread so rapidly to infect 247 members after the initial symptomatic case. With the 34th contingent having returned to South Korea on Tuesday, military authorities plan to work with the Korea Disease Control and Prevention Agency to review the specific infection pathways and overall response process.

The first question that arises is why rapid antibody testing kits were taken along when the Munmu the Great set sail in February, rather than highly accurate rapid antigen testing kits.

The consensus among experts is that antibody kits are of little use in identifying infections in the early stages. The questions have only grown amid conflicting accounts from the Ministry of National Defense (MND) and the Republic of Korea Navy (ROKN), each of which has been blaming the other.

When the issue first arose on Sunday, the ROKN said that “[personal] antigen kits had not yet been approved when the Cheonghae Unit departed in February of this year.”

But specialist antigen testing kits and antibody testing kits were both granted formal permission in November 2020.

In response to objections, the MND said Monday that it had sent an official notice in January ordering the use of antigen kits, and that both the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) headquarters and ROKN were unclear on why the ship had departed with antibody kits instead. The JCS gave the same explanation.

But the ROKN said Tuesday that the MND notice had not instructed the use of antigen kits rather than antibody kits. Instead, it called for limited use of antigen kits for supplementary testing of those with suspected symptoms.

The notice also reportedly said the sensitivity of antigen kits was “below 50%.” At the time, the company claimed that the antigen kits had reliability over 80%.

“We decided not to purchase antigen kits based on the determination that there was no need to replace antibody kits,” a ROKN official said.

But while antigen kits are used to confirm whether a person is infected with the COVID-19 virus, antibody kits are used to tell if they have formed antibodies as a result of a past infection. This makes the ROKN’s conclusion that there was “no need” to replace antibody kits with antigen kits difficult to comprehend.

The first symptoms among 34th contingent members were observed on July 2 — shortly after the Munmu the Great put in at a nearby port to load supplies such as oil, water, and provisions.

According to the JCS, all of this took place in compliance with protection regulations with the use of protective gear, although some contact did occur between June 28 and July 1 when around a dozen Munmu the Great crew members disembarked to connect hoses for potable water and spoke with supervisors. Provisions were loaded in containers, and no outside contact occurred in the process, the JCS said.

But all of the crew members had received negative polymerase chain reaction (PCR) test results when the ship departed in February, and the fact that the first symptomatic cases occurred after the ship put in lends weight to speculation that the infection occurred in that process.

“Whether the infection occurred through that activity is something we will only be able to tell once the unit has gone inside and conducted a detailed investigation,” a JCS official said.

Some have raised the possibility that the infection was transmitted through frozen foods.

But in a regular briefing Tuesday, Lee Sang-won, epidemiological investigation and analysis group director for the Central Disease Control Headquarters, said, “The general view is that the possibility of becoming infected through food consumption is low because the COVID-19 virus is a respiratory virus rather than an enteric virus.”

“The possibility of contact does exist, but it’s low,” he said. An epidemiological investigation is set to take place to determine the transmission route.

Still another unanswered question is why the 34th contingent concluded that symptomatic patients merely had “colds.”

According to accounts from the JCS, the 34th contingent concluded that the first symptomatic patient was exhibiting cold symptoms rather than COVID-19 symptoms.

The conclusion was reached by medical staff within the unit, and the military command also determined the patient to be suffering from a cold after a videoconference consultation. This was based on the fact that X-rays showed no signs of pneumonia, and antibody testing of around 50 crew members showed negative results.

The JCS has cited the negative antibody test results as proof that there were no flaws in its early response — even though antibody test results cannot be used to confirm whether a patient is currently infected with COVID-19.

Some have claimed that unit officials turned a blind eye when the possibility of COVID-19 was raised early on after some of the unit members reported that they had lost their senses of taste and smell. The JCS said it was “unaware that there had been any smell or taste issues.”

Unit members will need to be questioned to determine which symptoms they did report, and what the specific process was behind the conclusion that they were “cold symptoms.”

In a press conference Tuesday at the National Assembly Communication Building, People Power Party lawmaker and National Assembly National Defense Committee member Ha Tae-keung made public a telephone conversation he had with the father of a Cheonghae Unit member.

“Even when [the member’s] fever reached 40 degrees, the unit said it couldn’t possibly be COVID-19 because they hadn’t had contact with the outside, so they gave him a few Tylenol to get him through it,” Ha quoted the father as saying.

The 34th contingent only reported the situation to the JCS on July 10 after more and more crew members started coming down with “colds.” But no concrete instructions from the JCS have been found until July 15, when the entire crew underwent PCR testing.

A JCS official declined to speak in detail, saying only that there had been “activity orders.”

This is partially borne out by a report submitted to the National Assembly on Tuesday by the MND and JCS. After receiving a report from the 34th contingent on July 10, the JCS indicated that it had “ordered a suspension of operation activities and preparations for port entry to ensure the necessary conditions for patient management.”

The first patient to develop pneumonia symptoms tested positive while being admitted to a local hospital on July 14. After other unit members also tested positive on Thursday, the JCS “issued response guidelines from the Minister of National Defense and JCS Chairman, including full-scale PCR testing,” it said.

With the details suggesting the MND and JCS only took aggressive action once the infections were confirmed to be COVID-19, they appear likely to face criticisms over their belated response.

By Kim Ji-eun, staff reporter

Please direct comments or questions to [english@hani.co.kr]