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Headway has yet to be made in proceeding with negotiations over the North Korean nuclear program. Core figures in the U.S. administration have made statements about the country¡¯s basic position on the North Korean nuclear issue over the weekend, just prior to a tour of Asia by U.S. President Barack Obama scheduled for Nov. 13 to Nov. 19 with visits to South Korea, China and Japan. Analysts suggest the remarks convey the position that the North Korea visit by U.S. Special Representative for North Korea Policy Stephen Bosworth scheduled for late Nov. or early Dec. is for the purpose of ¡°dialogue¡± rather than ¡°negotiations.¡±
Regarding Bosworth¡¯s visit, U.S. Deputy Secretary of State James Steinberg said Friday that substantive discussions would need to take place through North Korea¡¯s return to the six-party talks. He also raised the possibility of a direct meeting to communicate a message about denuclearization. In other words, Steinberg rearticulated the position that discussions between North Korea and the U.S. are only possible within or subsequent to the six-party talks.
The same day, Jeffrey Bader, the senior director for East Asian Affairs on the White House¡®s National Security Council, said that bilateral dialogue would be a possibility if North Korea shows ¡°genuine signs¡± of understanding on two matters, namely that the six-party talks provide the proper framework for dialogue and that the September 19, 2005 Joint Statement still has binding force. According to Bonnie Glaser, senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, the U.S. has already informed the other nations participating in the six-party talks that it intends to limit its bilateral dialogue with North Korea to two rounds.
These remarks deviate considerably from predictions made after the U.S. State Department declared in mid-Sept. that it was prepared to engage in dialogue with North Korea. At the time, observers predicted that rapid headway would be made in North Korea-U.S. negotiations as a result of Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao¡¯s visit to North Korea in early Oct. The current situation indicates that the U.S. is recognizing North Korean leader Kim Jong-il¡¯s remarks to Wen last month, when he said North Korea was prepared to proceed with six-party talks depending on the results of bilateral talks with the U.S., as a reflection of North Korea¡¯s ¡°conditional¡± intent to return to the six-party talks format.
A senior South Korean official visiting Washington said, ¡°If North Korea says there is no possibility of it returning to the six-party talks, the U.S. will not proceed with North Korea-U.S. dialogue, however, the current situation doesn¡¯t permit us to conclude that a North Korean return to six-party talks is guaranteed following North Korea-U.S. dialogue.¡±
Observers are saying a compromise is possible given North Korea's stated intention to participate in six-party talks, and U.S. agree bilateral talks with North Korea take place concurrently with six-party talks.
As Steinberg has repeatedly stated, the Obama administration has consistently regarded the complete denuclearization of North Korea, based on the Sept. 19 Joint Statement, as its starting point and goal for discussions on the nuclear issue. What differs now is the U.S.¡¯s call for ¡°irreversible and verifiable¡± disablement instead of second-stage disablement established during the Bush administration. Observers say this is likely to be the core of the message communicated by the U.S. in bilateral dialogue with North Korea.
Analysts say that North Korea is seeing what the U.S. has demanded as the third stage of the Sept. 19 Joint Statement, not a second stage request. Accordingly analysts anticipate that North Korea is unlikely to accept the demand, unless the U.S. presents corresponding measures in the normalization of North Korea-U.S. relations, which would need to go beyond the cancellation of North Korea¡¯s status as a state sponsor of terrorism.
In this regard, an important question is what message the U.S. puts in the package Bosworth carries to North Korea. Positive signs include the fact that the approach to denuclearization distinguishes between nuclear weapons and nuclear materials and facilities programs, which leaves room for North Korea to accept the U.S.¡¯s current disablement demands, and the fact that North Korea is allowing Bosworth, unlike in the past, to meet with North Korean First Vice Foreign Minister Kang Sok Ju, a figure in the key line of North Korea¡¯s nuclear program. However, most analysts are skeptical about what can be accomplished in two rounds of North Korea-U.S. direct dialogue.
Please direct questions or comments to [englishhani@hani.co.kr]